In competitive Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) for IoT, an important task is to form friendships and groups for mutual cooperation. The existing proposals try to improve the profit of individual agent or group but, on the other hand, the most aggressive agents may take advantages from these approaches by means of malicious behaviors. In this work we model a MAS framework of non cooperative games by taking into account i) the reliability of agents relationships through a trust model and ii) the community ability to furnish a good environment to its members through its social capital. Thus, we designed an algorithm that maximizes the social capital. We emphasize two main findings: i) the result is a Nash equilibrium and ii) the agents are awarded only if they behave correctly.

Grouping IoT devices by Trust and Meritocracy / Fortino, G.; Fotia, L.; Messina, F.; Rosaci, D.; Sarne, G. M. L.. - (2021), pp. 1-5. (Intervento presentato al convegno 2021 International Conference on Cyber-Physical Social Intelligence, ICCSI 2021 tenutosi a chn nel 2021) [10.1109/ICCSI53130.2021.9736235].

Grouping IoT devices by Trust and Meritocracy

Rosaci D.;
2021-01-01

Abstract

In competitive Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) for IoT, an important task is to form friendships and groups for mutual cooperation. The existing proposals try to improve the profit of individual agent or group but, on the other hand, the most aggressive agents may take advantages from these approaches by means of malicious behaviors. In this work we model a MAS framework of non cooperative games by taking into account i) the reliability of agents relationships through a trust model and ii) the community ability to furnish a good environment to its members through its social capital. Thus, we designed an algorithm that maximizes the social capital. We emphasize two main findings: i) the result is a Nash equilibrium and ii) the agents are awarded only if they behave correctly.
2021
978-1-6654-2621-3
Competitive Agents
Group
IoT
Nash equilibrium
Trust
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12318/123580
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