The introduction of a review system in e-commerce platforms results in an effective business model. The effects of positive/negative reviews on the success of a product are well studied in the literature. Therefore, for the vendors, it is crucial to obtain positive reviews of their products. This fact opens fraudulent scenarios. Indeed, some vendors can pay an incentive to the buyers to obtain, in exchange, a fake positive review. This fake-review system (FRS) is so widespread that vendors rely on ad-hoc companies that, through intermediaries, find buyers available to release fake reviews. In this paper, we propose a game-theory-based strategy to discourage the above fraudulent business model, and an effective way to implement this strategy leveraging an Ethereum smart contract. Specifically, the contribution of the paper is two-fold. First, we formalize the current business model as a sequential game, and we identify sufficient conditions making FRS advantageous. Second, we propose to introduce in the review system a new mechanism, thanks to which, the corresponding sequential game requires conditions necessary to make advantageous FRS that are strictly less convenient than the previous ones. We implemented the solution and evaluate the cost of the smart contract execution.
A game theory-based approach to discourage fake reviews
De Angelis V.;Buccafurri F.
2021-01-01
Abstract
The introduction of a review system in e-commerce platforms results in an effective business model. The effects of positive/negative reviews on the success of a product are well studied in the literature. Therefore, for the vendors, it is crucial to obtain positive reviews of their products. This fact opens fraudulent scenarios. Indeed, some vendors can pay an incentive to the buyers to obtain, in exchange, a fake positive review. This fake-review system (FRS) is so widespread that vendors rely on ad-hoc companies that, through intermediaries, find buyers available to release fake reviews. In this paper, we propose a game-theory-based strategy to discourage the above fraudulent business model, and an effective way to implement this strategy leveraging an Ethereum smart contract. Specifically, the contribution of the paper is two-fold. First, we formalize the current business model as a sequential game, and we identify sufficient conditions making FRS advantageous. Second, we propose to introduce in the review system a new mechanism, thanks to which, the corresponding sequential game requires conditions necessary to make advantageous FRS that are strictly less convenient than the previous ones. We implemented the solution and evaluate the cost of the smart contract execution.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
