The concept of “final conviction” assumes significant importance in the reconstruction of the criminal conviction. The basic premise of the analysis of the institution is the traditional distinction between formal and substantive res judicata. The former refers to the stability that the dictum acquires as a result of the irrevocability of the decision; the concept of substantive res judicata, on the other hand, refers to the effects that depend on it. The logical - temporal derivation link between the prerequisites and the effects of res judicata, transposed into the legislation in article 648 et seq., risks manifesting itself in an atypical form whenever, in the course of the process, phenomena or institutions arise that entail a splitting of the res iudicanda, stabilising the content of certain provisions of the judgment while the judgment continues for the definition of the others. In these hypotheses, the need arises to clarify whether, and to what extent, a temporal decoupling between the moment when the judgment becomes irrevocable and the moment when it can be enforced is feasible. The resolution of this question is indispensable in view of the fact that the relationship between the irrevocability of the dictum and the enforceability of the sentence is, in fact, a constitutionally imposed necessity; article 27, 2, of the Constitution, in fact, by anchoring the overcoming of the presumption of innocence to the moment when the conviction becomes final, requires the execution of the sentence to be postponed until the moment when it becomes irrevocable. Any discrepancy in the relationship between the assumption of the irrevocability of the judgment and its enforceability carries in itself the risk of undermining the guarantee of the constitutional presumption, so that it is in the light of the meaning of "final conviction", reconstructed in its twofold dimension, temporal and content-related, that it is necessary to clarify the manner in which this relationship must, in practice, manifest itself. The proposed topic requires a preliminary analysis, from a historical and normative perspective, of the principles that have inspired the theory of res judicata, in order to understand what is the idea of res judicata contemplated in the Constitution and, subsequently, transposed by the legislature. More analytically, the examination of the normative references on the subject of res judicata, tackled with a view to clarifying the prerequisites required for the judgment to be enforceable, makes it possible to highlight that the need to re-evaluate the content of the judgment is in fact important, before the relationship between irrevocability and enforceability, for the purpose of identifying the measures that have the capacity to become irrevocable. Having clarified that only decisions that contain a finding on the issue of liability can formally become irrevocable, the need arises to distinguish the hypotheses in which the irrevocability of the judgment is substantiated by procedural preclusion from those in which the stability of the content of the non-appealed provisions takes on the force of irrevocability. This requirement arises, to a preponderant extent, in the context of the phenomenon of the progressive judgement, in respect of which the exact identification of the degree of stability characterising the provisions that have not been challenged, that is not annulled, is a prodromal activity for the reconstruction of the relationship existing between enforceability and the prerequisite of irrevocability, since only the latter can give rise to the enforcement of the penalty. Starting from the jurisprudential approaches on the subject, a corrective interpretation of the theory of res judicata on this point is proposed, in order to stem the dysfunctional consequences that the idea that only partial irrevocability in terms of ascertaining the fact and the judgement of guilt is worth integrating into the "final sentence" has generated in the system. To this end, the identification of a number of normative and jurisprudential references that, also from the perspective of comparative law, highlights the idea according to which the constitutionally required prerequisite for the purposes of overcoming the presumption of innocence and, therefore, the execution of the sentence requires that irrevocability must also have been formed on some of the provisions of the penalty treatment.
Il concetto di “condanna definitiva” assume significativa importanza nella ricostruzione del giudicato penale di condanna. Premessa di fondo dell’analisi dell’istituto è la tradizionale distinzione tra giudicato formale e sostanziale. Con la prima accezione ci si riferisce alla stabilità che il dictum acquisisce per effetto dell’irrevocabilità formatasi sulla decisione; il concetto di giudicato sostanziale, invece, richiama gli effetti che da essa sono dipendenti. Il nesso di derivazione logico – temporale tra presupposti ed effetti del giudicato, recepito normativamente agli artt. 648 c.p.p. ss., rischia di manifestarsi in forma atipica ogni qual volta, nel corso dell’iter di accertamento, si manifestano fenomeni o istituti che comportano un frazionamento della res iudicanda, stabilizzando il contenuto di alcune disposizioni della sentenza mentre il giudizio prosegue per la definizione delle altre. In queste ipotesi, si pone la necessità di chiarire se, e in quale misura, sia praticabile uno scollamento temporale tra il momento in cui la sentenza diviene irrevocabile e quello in cui ad essa possa darsi esecuzione. La risoluzione di tale interrogativo si rende indispensabile in considerazione del fatto che il rapporto tra l’irrevocabilità del dictum e la forza esecutiva della sentenza è, in realtà, una necessità costituzionalmente imposta; l’art. 27, comma 2, Cost., infatti, ancorando il superamento della presunzione di non colpevolezza al momento in cui la condanna diviene definitiva, esige di rinviare l’esecuzione della sentenza al momento in cui essa diviene irrevocabile. Qualsiasi scollamento nel rapporto tra il presupposto dell’irrevocabilità della sentenza e la sua efficacia esecutiva reca in sé il rischio di pregiudicare la garanzia della presunzione costituzionale, sicché è alla luce del significato della “condanna definitiva”, ricostruito nella duplice dimensione, temporale e contenutistica, che è necessario chiarire il modo in cui tale rapporto debba, concretamente, manifestarsi. Il tema proposto esige di analizzare, in via preliminare, e in prospettiva storico – normativa, i principi che hanno ispirato la teoria del giudicato, allo scopo di comprendere quale sia l’idea di giudicato contemplata nella costituzione e, successivamente, recepita dal legislatore. Più analiticamente, l’esame dei riferimenti normativi in tema di giudicato, affrontato nella prospettiva di chiarire quali siano i presupposti richiesti ai fini della esecutività della sentenza, consente di mettere in luce che, in effetti, la necessità di rivalutare il contenuto della sentenza rileva, prima che sul versante del rapporto tra irrevocabilità ed esecutività, ai fini dell’individuazione dei provvedimenti dotati dell’attitudine a divenire irrevocabili. Chiarito che soltanto le decisioni che contengono un accertamento sul tema della responsabilità possono divenire formalmente irrevocabili, si pone l’esigenza di distinguere le ipotesi in cui l’inoppugnabilità della sentenza si sostanzia nella preclusione processuale da quelle in cui la stabilità del contenuto delle disposizioni non impugnate assume la forza dell’irrevocabilità. Tale esigenza si pone, in misura preponderante, nell’ambito del fenomeno del giudicato progressivo, rispetto cui l’esatta individuazione del grado di stabilità che caratterizza le disposizioni non impugnate, ovvero non annullate, è attività prodromica alla ricostruzione del rapporto sussistente tra l’esecutività e il presupposto dell’irrevocabilità, poiché solo questa può dare origine all’esecuzione della pena. Muovendo dagli approdi giurisprudenziali sul tema, si propone un’interpretazione correttiva della teoria del giudicato sul punto, allo scopo di arginare le conseguenze disfunzionali che l’idea secondo cui la sola irrevocabilità parziale in punto di accertamento del fatto e di giudizio di colpevolezza valga ad integrare la “condanna definitiva” ha generato sul sistema. Dirimente, a tal fine, risulta essere l’individuazione di alcuni riferimenti normativi e giurisprudenziali che, anche in prospettiva di diritto comparato, mette in luce l’idea secondo cui il presupposto costituzionalmente richiesto ai fini del superamento della presunzione di non colpevolezza e, dunque, dell’esecuzione della sentenza esige che l’irrevocabilità si sia formata anche su alcune delle disposizioni del trattamento sanzionatorio.
La condanna definitiva / Camera, Lavinia. - (2023 Oct 23).
La condanna definitiva
Camera, Lavinia
2023-10-23
Abstract
The concept of “final conviction” assumes significant importance in the reconstruction of the criminal conviction. The basic premise of the analysis of the institution is the traditional distinction between formal and substantive res judicata. The former refers to the stability that the dictum acquires as a result of the irrevocability of the decision; the concept of substantive res judicata, on the other hand, refers to the effects that depend on it. The logical - temporal derivation link between the prerequisites and the effects of res judicata, transposed into the legislation in article 648 et seq., risks manifesting itself in an atypical form whenever, in the course of the process, phenomena or institutions arise that entail a splitting of the res iudicanda, stabilising the content of certain provisions of the judgment while the judgment continues for the definition of the others. In these hypotheses, the need arises to clarify whether, and to what extent, a temporal decoupling between the moment when the judgment becomes irrevocable and the moment when it can be enforced is feasible. The resolution of this question is indispensable in view of the fact that the relationship between the irrevocability of the dictum and the enforceability of the sentence is, in fact, a constitutionally imposed necessity; article 27, 2, of the Constitution, in fact, by anchoring the overcoming of the presumption of innocence to the moment when the conviction becomes final, requires the execution of the sentence to be postponed until the moment when it becomes irrevocable. Any discrepancy in the relationship between the assumption of the irrevocability of the judgment and its enforceability carries in itself the risk of undermining the guarantee of the constitutional presumption, so that it is in the light of the meaning of "final conviction", reconstructed in its twofold dimension, temporal and content-related, that it is necessary to clarify the manner in which this relationship must, in practice, manifest itself. The proposed topic requires a preliminary analysis, from a historical and normative perspective, of the principles that have inspired the theory of res judicata, in order to understand what is the idea of res judicata contemplated in the Constitution and, subsequently, transposed by the legislature. More analytically, the examination of the normative references on the subject of res judicata, tackled with a view to clarifying the prerequisites required for the judgment to be enforceable, makes it possible to highlight that the need to re-evaluate the content of the judgment is in fact important, before the relationship between irrevocability and enforceability, for the purpose of identifying the measures that have the capacity to become irrevocable. Having clarified that only decisions that contain a finding on the issue of liability can formally become irrevocable, the need arises to distinguish the hypotheses in which the irrevocability of the judgment is substantiated by procedural preclusion from those in which the stability of the content of the non-appealed provisions takes on the force of irrevocability. This requirement arises, to a preponderant extent, in the context of the phenomenon of the progressive judgement, in respect of which the exact identification of the degree of stability characterising the provisions that have not been challenged, that is not annulled, is a prodromal activity for the reconstruction of the relationship existing between enforceability and the prerequisite of irrevocability, since only the latter can give rise to the enforcement of the penalty. Starting from the jurisprudential approaches on the subject, a corrective interpretation of the theory of res judicata on this point is proposed, in order to stem the dysfunctional consequences that the idea that only partial irrevocability in terms of ascertaining the fact and the judgement of guilt is worth integrating into the "final sentence" has generated in the system. To this end, the identification of a number of normative and jurisprudential references that, also from the perspective of comparative law, highlights the idea according to which the constitutionally required prerequisite for the purposes of overcoming the presumption of innocence and, therefore, the execution of the sentence requires that irrevocability must also have been formed on some of the provisions of the penalty treatment.File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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