In the last decades the European Union (EU) has had to come up with a more efficient strategy to address the several threats to its security. Some of these occurred at sea and pushed the EU to develop new operational military capabilities at sea. The EU has launched two naval operations in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy: Atalanta, aimed at combating piracy off the coasts of Somalia, and Sophia, aimed at disrupting the business model of human smuggling and trafficking in the Central Mediterranean Sea. In addition, a fundamental role in protecting the European internal security is played by Frontex joint operations at sea, designed to patrol the external maritime borders of the EU and fight irregular migration flows. This thesis has outlined systematically the above-mentioned operations with the aims to assess their effectiveness, to examine their enforcement powers from the viewpoint of the international law and the EU law and to verify the respect of human rights during their implementation. It was found that Frontex operations and operation Sophia have got extraordinary results with respect to the saving of lives, while less significant is their contribution to the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks. The most important shortcoming is represented by their operational area, limited to the high sea. The European assets are so prevented from entering the Libyan waters and territory, where traffickers’ strongholds are located. The impossibility to act therein has strongly scaled down the efficacy of operation Sophia and pushed the EU to elaborate an exit strategy: the training of the Libyan Coast Guard. This solution has consequences on the respect of human rights given the careless modus operandi of the latter and the serious violations of fundamental rights faced by migrants in Libya. The study has also found that the EU naval operations are realized in compliance with the international rules governing the use of force and with the consent of the coastal States. The only exception to that is envisaged by resolutions 2240 (2015) and 2292 (2016) of the UN Security Council, authorizing the inspection and the seizure of foreign ships suspected of human or arms trafficking in the high seas off the Libyan coasts. However, it is so limited ratione loci, materiae and temporis that its effect is no baring in practice. Moreover, it then can be argued that the use of force in the framework of the EU naval operations is in some ways worthy being criticized. It is generally accepted that the basic rules governing the use of force in board¬ing private vessels requires that force must be avoided as far as possible and, if unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary according to the circumstances. Nulla quaestio for Atalanta assets using lethal force when armed robbers and pirates try to avoid the apprehension. On the contrary, it is highly debated if the use of force against helpless migrants’ boats intercepted while attempting to cross the Mediterranean by Sophia or Frontex operations assets can be in line with the principles of necessity, proportionality and extrema ratio, except for the case of self-defence. Another controversial aspect of the studied operations is the determination of the member State where to disembark persons rescued at sea. As is well known, so far the management of migration flows through the Mediterranean Sea has imposed an extraordinary burden upon Italy. Hence, the introduction of a mechanism for the fair distribution of that burden among all participating Member States is highly recommended and it would be in line with the principle of solidarity and fair shar¬ing of responsibility (art. 80 TFEU). Finally, the research has proved the possibility that human rights violations could occur during the implementation of the operations mandate, in particular with regard to the principle of non-refoulement. ECtHR case law dealing with the extraterritorial application of ECHR has shown that the high sea regime cannot be invoked to identify a “free zone” where State Parties are not obliged to guarantee the protection of human rights, as long as they exercise an effective control over individuals. Currently, none of the EU naval operations push back persons intercepted at sea; nonetheless, the case in which they could be disembarked in a third State qualified as «safe» by the EU but that doesn’t comply with European human rights standards is not a remote hypothesis.

Con l’intento di fronteggiare le vecchie e le nuove minacce provenienti dal mare, nel corso degli ultimi decenni, l’Unione Europea (UE) ha intrapreso diverse operazioni navali condotte con mezzi militari: le missioni della Politica di Sicurezza e Difesa Comune (PSDC) Atalanta e Sophia, volte a reprimere rispettivamente la pirateria al largo della Somalia e il traffico di migranti nel Mediterraneo centromeridionale, e le numerose operazioni congiunte degli Stati membri coordinate da Frontex e dirette a sorvegliare efficacemente le frontiere marittime dell’Unione per contrastare l’immigrazione irregolare. La presente tesi ha condotto un’analisi sistematica e puntuale di tutte le suddette operazioni alla luce del diritto internazionale e del diritto dell'UE, con lo scopo di valutarne l’efficacia, vagliare i poteri di cui sono dotate e verificare il rispetto dei diritti umani nella loro attuazione concreta. Dall’analisi condotta è emerso che le operazioni di Frontex e la missione Sophia hanno svolto un ruolo cruciale nel salvare vite umane, mentre meno significativi sono stati i risultati conseguiti nella lotta al traffico di migranti. Il limite principale è rappresentato dal fatto che esse operano unicamente in acque internazionali, non potendo così raggiungere e catturare i trafficanti di esseri umani nelle loro roccaforti sulle coste libiche. Ciò ha indotto gli organi della PSDC a cambiare strategia e a introdurre nel mandato di Sophia il compito di addestrare la Guardia costiera libica, affinché sia questa a catturare i trafficanti nelle acque sottoposte alla giurisdizione libica e a condurre le azioni di ricerca e soccorso dei migranti intercettati nella zona SAR libica. Tale cooperazione solleva però serie perplessità sul piano della tutela dei diritti umani, visti il modus operandi della Guardia costiera libica e i gravissimi abusi cui sono sottoposti in Libia i migranti. Le operazioni navali dell’UE sono realizzate nel rispetto dei limiti all’uso della forza posti dal diritto internazionale e non incidono sui diritti sovrani degli Stati costieri, se non con il consenso di questi. L’unica eccezione a quanto appena detto, prevista dalle risoluzioni 2240 (2015) e 2292 (2016) che hanno autorizzato l’ispezione e il sequestro delle imbarcazioni straniere sospettate di traffico di migranti o di armi nelle acque internazionali al largo della Libia anche senza il consenso dello Stato della bandiera, ha comunque una portata molto limitata e i suoi risultati sono quasi impercettibili sul piano pratico. L’uso della forza da parte delle unità aeronavali europee è, tuttavia, criticabile per certi versi. Il ricorso alla forza in mare è ammissibile solo se inevitabile e entro i limiti di ciò che è necessario e ragionevole in base alle circostanze del caso. Orbene, mentre è agevolmente ipotizzabile che le unità di Atalanta ricorrano alla forza armata nei confronti di una nave pirata che cerchi di sfuggire alla cattura, è difficile ipotizzare un uso della forza da parte delle unità di Sophia o delle operazioni di Frontex che sia conforme ai principi di necessità, proporzionalità ed extrema ratio nei confronti delle imbarcazioni cariche di migranti, se non nel raro caso della legittima difesa. Un ulteriore aspetto critico delle suddette operazioni è rappresentato dall’individuazione del luogo di sbarco dei migranti soccorsi in mare. Si è infatti visto che finora l’Italia ha sopportato da sola gran parte del peso dell’emergenza. È invece decisamente auspicabile l’istituzione di un meccanismo di redistribuzione delle persone soccorse tra gli Stati membri partecipanti, in ossequio al principio di solidarietà ed equa ripartizione delle responsabilità, di cui all’art. 80 TFUE. Infine, non è da sottovalutare il rischio che gli Stati membri partecipanti alle operazioni si rendano responsabili di gravi violazioni dei diritti fondamentali nei confronti degli individui coinvolti. Particolari preoccupazioni sorgono in relazione al rispetto del divieto di refoulement. La giurisprudenza della Corte di Strasburgo in materia di applicazione extraterritoriale della CEDU dimostra che il regime dell’alto mare non può essere invocato per individuare una “zona franca” dove gli Stati parti non sono vincolati al rispetto dei diritti in essa enunciati, se vi esercitano un controllo effettivo sugli individui. Attualmente, nessuna delle operazioni navali dell'UE effettua dei respingimenti. Tuttavia, non è affatto remota l’ipotesi in cui le persone intercettate o soccorse in mare vengano fatte sbarcare in uno Stato terzo considerato dall’Unione «sicuro», ma di fatto non rispettoso degli standars europei sui diritti umani.

Le operazioni navali dell’Unione Europea / Meduri, Maria Giovanna. - (2019 Apr 17).

Le operazioni navali dell’Unione Europea

MEDURI, Maria Giovanna
2019-04-17

Abstract

In the last decades the European Union (EU) has had to come up with a more efficient strategy to address the several threats to its security. Some of these occurred at sea and pushed the EU to develop new operational military capabilities at sea. The EU has launched two naval operations in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy: Atalanta, aimed at combating piracy off the coasts of Somalia, and Sophia, aimed at disrupting the business model of human smuggling and trafficking in the Central Mediterranean Sea. In addition, a fundamental role in protecting the European internal security is played by Frontex joint operations at sea, designed to patrol the external maritime borders of the EU and fight irregular migration flows. This thesis has outlined systematically the above-mentioned operations with the aims to assess their effectiveness, to examine their enforcement powers from the viewpoint of the international law and the EU law and to verify the respect of human rights during their implementation. It was found that Frontex operations and operation Sophia have got extraordinary results with respect to the saving of lives, while less significant is their contribution to the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks. The most important shortcoming is represented by their operational area, limited to the high sea. The European assets are so prevented from entering the Libyan waters and territory, where traffickers’ strongholds are located. The impossibility to act therein has strongly scaled down the efficacy of operation Sophia and pushed the EU to elaborate an exit strategy: the training of the Libyan Coast Guard. This solution has consequences on the respect of human rights given the careless modus operandi of the latter and the serious violations of fundamental rights faced by migrants in Libya. The study has also found that the EU naval operations are realized in compliance with the international rules governing the use of force and with the consent of the coastal States. The only exception to that is envisaged by resolutions 2240 (2015) and 2292 (2016) of the UN Security Council, authorizing the inspection and the seizure of foreign ships suspected of human or arms trafficking in the high seas off the Libyan coasts. However, it is so limited ratione loci, materiae and temporis that its effect is no baring in practice. Moreover, it then can be argued that the use of force in the framework of the EU naval operations is in some ways worthy being criticized. It is generally accepted that the basic rules governing the use of force in board¬ing private vessels requires that force must be avoided as far as possible and, if unavoidable, it must not go beyond what is reasonable and necessary according to the circumstances. Nulla quaestio for Atalanta assets using lethal force when armed robbers and pirates try to avoid the apprehension. On the contrary, it is highly debated if the use of force against helpless migrants’ boats intercepted while attempting to cross the Mediterranean by Sophia or Frontex operations assets can be in line with the principles of necessity, proportionality and extrema ratio, except for the case of self-defence. Another controversial aspect of the studied operations is the determination of the member State where to disembark persons rescued at sea. As is well known, so far the management of migration flows through the Mediterranean Sea has imposed an extraordinary burden upon Italy. Hence, the introduction of a mechanism for the fair distribution of that burden among all participating Member States is highly recommended and it would be in line with the principle of solidarity and fair shar¬ing of responsibility (art. 80 TFEU). Finally, the research has proved the possibility that human rights violations could occur during the implementation of the operations mandate, in particular with regard to the principle of non-refoulement. ECtHR case law dealing with the extraterritorial application of ECHR has shown that the high sea regime cannot be invoked to identify a “free zone” where State Parties are not obliged to guarantee the protection of human rights, as long as they exercise an effective control over individuals. Currently, none of the EU naval operations push back persons intercepted at sea; nonetheless, the case in which they could be disembarked in a third State qualified as «safe» by the EU but that doesn’t comply with European human rights standards is not a remote hypothesis.
17-apr-2019
Settore IUS/06 - DIRITTO DELLA NAVIGAZIONE
MANCINI, Marina
MANGANARO, Francesco
Doctoral Thesis
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12318/63599
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