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Spatial discrimination, product substitutability and welfare

The paper examines a quantity-location duopoly game in a spatial discrimination model in which the delivered goods are assumed to be imperfect substitutes or complements. By extending the range of the unit transportation cost analysed in the existing literature, it is shown that a dispersed equilibrium arises in which the choice of the optimal locations is affected by the degree of product substitutability. The interaction between the latter and the size of the transportation cost is also dis...

Competition and the strategic choice of managerial incentives: The relative performance case

We investigate how market competition affects the incentive to adopt a non-profit-maximizing behaviour. The analysis is developed in a strategic delegation framework in which owners delegate output decisions to managers interested in firm's relative performance. We study how the optimal delegation scheme is affected by market concentration and the elasticity of market demand. We prove that the distortion from a profit-maximizing rule decreases as market becomes less concentrated, while it inc...

Quantity competition, endogenous motives and behavioral heterogeneity

The article shows that strategic quantity competition can be characterized by behavioral heterogeneity, once competing firms are allowed in a pre-market stage to optimally choose the behavioral rule they will follow in their strategic choice of quantities. In particular, partitions of the population of identical firms in which some of them are profit maximizers while others follow an alternative criterion, turn out to be deviation-proof equilibria both in simultaneous and sequential game stru...

Private and social gains in delegation and sequential games with heterogeneous firms

We investigate both quantity and price competition in two differentiated oligopolistic frameworks in which firms are heterogeneous with respect to the ownership structure, i.e. managerial firms compete against entrepreneurial firms, or to the timing decisions, i.e. leaders compete against followers. We show the circumstances under which delegation and sequential strategies, shown to be equivalent under unilateral delegation (Vickers, The Economic Journal, Vol. 95 (1985), pp. 138-147), enable ...

Price or quantity? The strategic choice of subsidized firms in a mixed duopoly

This paper investigates the endogenous choice of the strategic variable, price or quantity, taken in a mixed duopoly by a public and a private firm prior to market competition. While Matsumura and Ogawa (2012) in a standard mixed duopoly find that price is the unique equilibrium, we show that, by introducing firm subsidization in the same setting, quantity can constitute a dominant strategy equilibrium. © 2012 Elsevier B.V.

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