We consider investment decisions in a discrete time, two-stage real option game where firms move sequentially, in the context of a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) problem. The value of the option depends on the market structure which we assume to be either a monopoly or a Bertrand differentiated duopoly. We show that, in an equilibrium where no firm invests in the first period, a government intervention, in form of a subsidy, can improve the welfare level.
On the welfare and policy implications of a two-period real option game / Wang, C., Chen, S., Wang, Y., Pansera, B.A., Luckraz, S.. - In: SOCIO-ECONOMIC PLANNING SCIENCES. - ISSN 0038-0121. - 90:(2023). [10.1016/j.seps.2023.101717]
On the welfare and policy implications of a two-period real option game
Pansera, Bruno AntonioFormal Analysis
;
2023-01-01
Abstract
We consider investment decisions in a discrete time, two-stage real option game where firms move sequentially, in the context of a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) problem. The value of the option depends on the market structure which we assume to be either a monopoly or a Bertrand differentiated duopoly. We show that, in an equilibrium where no firm invests in the first period, a government intervention, in form of a subsidy, can improve the welfare level.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
|---|---|---|---|
|
Pansera_2023_S-EPS_Welfare_editor.pdf
solo utenti autorizzati
Tipologia:
Versione Editoriale (PDF)
Licenza:
Tutti i diritti riservati (All rights reserved)
Dimensione
1.31 MB
Formato
Adobe PDF
|
1.31 MB | Adobe PDF | Visualizza/Apri Richiedi una copia |
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
