We investigate both quantity and price competition in two differentiated oligopolistic frameworks in which firms are heterogeneous with respect to the ownership structure, i.e. managerial firms compete against entrepreneurial firms, or to the timing decisions, i.e. leaders compete against followers. We show the circumstances under which delegation and sequential strategies, shown to be equivalent under unilateral delegation (Vickers, The Economic Journal, Vol. 95 (1985), pp. 138-147), enable firms to out-perform their rivals and create scope for welfare gains. The different effects of changes in market structure and the degree of product substitutability on firms' profitability and social welfare are discussed. © 2012 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and The University of Manchester.
Private and social gains in delegation and sequential games with heterogeneous firms / Scrimitore, M.. - In: MANCHESTER SCHOOL. - ISSN 1463-6786. - 81:4(2013), pp. 493-517. [10.1111/j.1467-9957.2012.02297.x]
Private and social gains in delegation and sequential games with heterogeneous firms
Scrimitore M.
2013-01-01
Abstract
We investigate both quantity and price competition in two differentiated oligopolistic frameworks in which firms are heterogeneous with respect to the ownership structure, i.e. managerial firms compete against entrepreneurial firms, or to the timing decisions, i.e. leaders compete against followers. We show the circumstances under which delegation and sequential strategies, shown to be equivalent under unilateral delegation (Vickers, The Economic Journal, Vol. 95 (1985), pp. 138-147), enable firms to out-perform their rivals and create scope for welfare gains. The different effects of changes in market structure and the degree of product substitutability on firms' profitability and social welfare are discussed. © 2012 John Wiley & Sons Ltd and The University of Manchester.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
