The article shows that strategic quantity competition can be characterized by behavioral heterogeneity, once competing firms are allowed in a pre-market stage to optimally choose the behavioral rule they will follow in their strategic choice of quantities. In particular, partitions of the population of identical firms in which some of them are profit maximizers while others follow an alternative criterion, turn out to be deviation-proof equilibria both in simultaneous and sequential game structures. Our findings that in a strategic framework heterogeneous behavioral rules may be consistent with individual incentives is a first attempt to provide a game-theoretic microfoundation of heterogeneity. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media New York.
Quantity competition, endogenous motives and behavioral heterogeneity / Chirco, A.; Colombo, C.; Scrimitore, M.. - In: THEORY AND DECISION. - ISSN 0040-5833. - 74:1(2013), pp. 55-74. [10.1007/s11238-012-9341-4]
Quantity competition, endogenous motives and behavioral heterogeneity
Colombo C.;Scrimitore M.
2013-01-01
Abstract
The article shows that strategic quantity competition can be characterized by behavioral heterogeneity, once competing firms are allowed in a pre-market stage to optimally choose the behavioral rule they will follow in their strategic choice of quantities. In particular, partitions of the population of identical firms in which some of them are profit maximizers while others follow an alternative criterion, turn out to be deviation-proof equilibria both in simultaneous and sequential game structures. Our findings that in a strategic framework heterogeneous behavioral rules may be consistent with individual incentives is a first attempt to provide a game-theoretic microfoundation of heterogeneity. © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media New York.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
