We investigate how market competition affects the incentive to adopt a non-profit-maximizing behaviour. The analysis is developed in a strategic delegation framework in which owners delegate output decisions to managers interested in firm's relative performance. We study how the optimal delegation scheme is affected by market concentration and the elasticity of market demand. We prove that the distortion from a profit-maximizing rule decreases as market becomes less concentrated, while it increases as demand becomes more elastic. Finally, we discuss the impact of market competitiveness on the welfare-enhancing ability of delegation contracts. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Competition and the strategic choice of managerial incentives: The relative performance case / Chirco, A.; Scrimitore, M.; Colombo, C.. - In: METROECONOMICA. - ISSN 0026-1386. - 62:4(2011), pp. 533-547. [10.1111/j.1467-999X.2011.04124.x]
Competition and the strategic choice of managerial incentives: The relative performance case
Scrimitore M.;Colombo C.
2011-01-01
Abstract
We investigate how market competition affects the incentive to adopt a non-profit-maximizing behaviour. The analysis is developed in a strategic delegation framework in which owners delegate output decisions to managers interested in firm's relative performance. We study how the optimal delegation scheme is affected by market concentration and the elasticity of market demand. We prove that the distortion from a profit-maximizing rule decreases as market becomes less concentrated, while it increases as demand becomes more elastic. Finally, we discuss the impact of market competitiveness on the welfare-enhancing ability of delegation contracts. © 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
