Organizations adopting generative AI (GenAI) face complex strategic tensions among management, departments, and employees that fundamentally determine adoption outcomes. This study develops a multi-level Bayesian game-theoretic framework modeling these multi-stakeholder interactions, identifying four distinct adoption patterns through formal equilibrium analysis. Our theoretical derivations establish that successful GenAI implementation requires three analytically-derived conditions: (1) strong strategic complementarity across departments, (2) efficient investment allocation, and (3) effective employee displacement mitigation. The formal model specifies explicit utility functions for three stakeholder groups — senior management, departmental units, and individual employees — and characterizes Bayesian Nash equilibria under incomplete information. Companies must simultaneously invest in cross-functional coordination mechanisms, establish shared governance structures, and implement workforce development programs that position GenAI as a capability enhancement rather than a job replacement. Our computational analysis, based on 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations with explicit parameter specifications and convergence criteria, demonstrates that coordination-focused strategies significantly outperform technology-focused approaches in organizational welfare, providing actionable guidance for AI transformation leadership.

Strategic tensions in organizational GenAI adoption: A game theory modeling of internal resource competition, workforce dynamics, and value management / Ferrara, Massimiliano; Viglia, Giampaolo; Carlos Romero, Jose. - In: TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING AND SOCIAL CHANGE. - ISSN 1873-5509. - 227:(2026). [10.1016/j.techfore.2026.124653]

Strategic tensions in organizational GenAI adoption: A game theory modeling of internal resource competition, workforce dynamics, and value management

Massimiliano Ferrara
Conceptualization
;
2026-01-01

Abstract

Organizations adopting generative AI (GenAI) face complex strategic tensions among management, departments, and employees that fundamentally determine adoption outcomes. This study develops a multi-level Bayesian game-theoretic framework modeling these multi-stakeholder interactions, identifying four distinct adoption patterns through formal equilibrium analysis. Our theoretical derivations establish that successful GenAI implementation requires three analytically-derived conditions: (1) strong strategic complementarity across departments, (2) efficient investment allocation, and (3) effective employee displacement mitigation. The formal model specifies explicit utility functions for three stakeholder groups — senior management, departmental units, and individual employees — and characterizes Bayesian Nash equilibria under incomplete information. Companies must simultaneously invest in cross-functional coordination mechanisms, establish shared governance structures, and implement workforce development programs that position GenAI as a capability enhancement rather than a job replacement. Our computational analysis, based on 10,000 Monte Carlo simulations with explicit parameter specifications and convergence criteria, demonstrates that coordination-focused strategies significantly outperform technology-focused approaches in organizational welfare, providing actionable guidance for AI transformation leadership.
2026
Generative artificial intelligence; Organizational transformation; Game theory; Workforce dynamics; Resource allocation; Value co-creation; Value co-destruction;Strategic information systems
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12318/165346
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