In this paper we intend to offer a kind of "rational" explanation of tax evasion as a result of territorial divergences in individual preferences for public goods due to income differentials. The essay is divided into two parts. In the first one some classic contributions to the theory of public goods are reviewed, with an emphasis on horizontal disequilibria (as opposed to the vertical ones almost exclusively taken into account in the relevant literature) that may arise from the indentity of the tax price charged to individuals with different marginal evaluations of public goods. The second part is publicy provided goods and services, aimed at showing how local governments might tolerate a certain amount of tax evasion as a way to accomodate to their constituency's preferences for private and public goods as the latter diverge from those shaping centrally made decisions, based on a median voter's profile.
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.