The aim of this study is to analyse a discrete-time two-stage game with R&D competition by considering a continuous-time set-up with fixed delays. The model is represented in the form of delay differential equations. The stability of all the equilibrium points is studied. It is found that the model exhibits very complex dynamical behaviours, and its Nash equilibrium is destabilised via Hopf bifurcations
Bifurcation Analysis of a Duopoly Game with R&D Spillover, Price Competition and Time Delays
Massimiliano Ferrara
Supervision
;Bruno Antonio PanseraMethodology
;Tiziana CianoFormal Analysis
2020-01-01
Abstract
The aim of this study is to analyse a discrete-time two-stage game with R&D competition by considering a continuous-time set-up with fixed delays. The model is represented in the form of delay differential equations. The stability of all the equilibrium points is studied. It is found that the model exhibits very complex dynamical behaviours, and its Nash equilibrium is destabilised via Hopf bifurcationsFile in questo prodotto:
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