Abstract: I investigate whether the adoption of a two-stage public goods framework causes a change in contributions to public goods compared to a standard public goods game. For this purpose, my first treatment (S) is a standard public goods game and represents the baseline treatment. The second treatment (D) is a twostage public goods game. In each stage, agents allocate their endowments between a private good and a public good. The results show that subjects contribute more to the public good in the S treatment than in the D treatment. In addition, agents under the D treatment evenly divide their limited endowments between both public goods, regardless of differences in the marginal per capita returns of the two goods.

Behaviour in a Two-Stage Public Goods Experiment / FINOCCHIARO CASTRO, Massimo. - In: WSEAS TRANSACTIONS ON BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS. - ISSN 2224-2899. - 10:2(2013), pp. 80-88.

Behaviour in a Two-Stage Public Goods Experiment

FINOCCHIARO CASTRO, Massimo
2013-01-01

Abstract

Abstract: I investigate whether the adoption of a two-stage public goods framework causes a change in contributions to public goods compared to a standard public goods game. For this purpose, my first treatment (S) is a standard public goods game and represents the baseline treatment. The second treatment (D) is a twostage public goods game. In each stage, agents allocate their endowments between a private good and a public good. The results show that subjects contribute more to the public good in the S treatment than in the D treatment. In addition, agents under the D treatment evenly divide their limited endowments between both public goods, regardless of differences in the marginal per capita returns of the two goods.
2013
two-stage public goods game; voluntary provision; experiments
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12318/6007
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