The main objective of the paper is to analyze how policymakers influence the ran- dom oligopolistic market equilibrium problem. To this purpose, random optimal control equilibrium conditions are introduced. Since the random optimal regulatory tax is characterized by a stochastic inverse variational inequality, existence and well- posedness results on such an inequality are proved. At last a numerical example is discussed

Notes on random optimal control equilibrium problem via stochastic inverse variational inequalities

Bruno Antonio Pansera
Membro del Collaboration Group
;
Massimiliano Ferrara
Supervision
2024-01-01

Abstract

The main objective of the paper is to analyze how policymakers influence the ran- dom oligopolistic market equilibrium problem. To this purpose, random optimal control equilibrium conditions are introduced. Since the random optimal regulatory tax is characterized by a stochastic inverse variational inequality, existence and well- posedness results on such an inequality are proved. At last a numerical example is discussed
2024
Random optimal control equilibrium problem; Stochastic inverse variational inequalities; Existence results; Well-posedness analysis
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12318/143266
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