The main objective of the paper is to analyze how policymakers influence the ran- dom oligopolistic market equilibrium problem. To this purpose, random optimal control equilibrium conditions are introduced. Since the random optimal regulatory tax is characterized by a stochastic inverse variational inequality, existence and well- posedness results on such an inequality are proved. At last a numerical example is discussed
Notes on random optimal control equilibrium problem via stochastic inverse variational inequalities
Bruno Antonio PanseraMembro del Collaboration Group
;Massimiliano FerraraSupervision
2024-01-01
Abstract
The main objective of the paper is to analyze how policymakers influence the ran- dom oligopolistic market equilibrium problem. To this purpose, random optimal control equilibrium conditions are introduced. Since the random optimal regulatory tax is characterized by a stochastic inverse variational inequality, existence and well- posedness results on such an inequality are proved. At last a numerical example is discussedFile in questo prodotto:
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